Постановление ЕСПЧ от 16.02.2016 <Дело Евдокимов и другие (Yevdokimov and Others) против России> (жалобы N 27236/05, 44223/05, 53304/07, 40232/11, 60052/11, 76438/11, 14919/12, 19929/12, 42389/12, 57043/12 and 67481/12) [англ.] Часть 2

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  1. Particular features of Russian civil procedure


  1. The Court notes that, by contrast with some other jurisdictions (see the case-law cited in paragraph 23 above), the Russian rules of civil procedure stipulate that proceedings must be conducted orally (Article 157 of the Code of Civil Procedure, cited in paragraph 9 above). The Code of Civil Procedure makes no provision for conducting civil proceedings in writing or for dispensing with an oral hearing, which must be held before both the first-instance and the appeal courts (Articles 155, 327 (currently in force) and 350 (formerly in force) of the Code of Civil Procedure).
  2. The right to be present in person is in principle not subject to any formalities and a party need not seek leave to appear in order to attend the hearing and to make oral submissions to the court. There is a requirement to inform the parties of the time and place of the hearing (Article 155 of the Code of Civil Procedure) and the bench has a corresponding duty to verify the attendance and due notification of the parties before embarking on the examination of the case (Article 161 of the Code). If it cannot be ascertained that an absent party has been notified, or if the party has valid reasons for being absent, the hearing must be adjourned (Article 167 of the Code). Identical requirements apply to proceedings before the first-instance and appeal courts (former Article 350 and current Article 327 of the Code).
  3. In Russian civil procedure, representation is not the exclusive province of legal professionals. Any adult individual, be it a next-of-kin, a friend or anyone else, is legally entitled to represent the claimant or the defendant in the civil proceedings (Articles 48 and 49 of the Code of Civil Procedure). Representation by a professional lawyer is available free of charge to indigent litigants, but only in specific types of disputes which are exhaustively listed in the Legal Aid Act (see paragraph 10 above).


  1. The Court’s approach


  1. The Court notes that the rules of Russian civil procedure require courts to hold an oral hearing in all categories of cases without exception (see paragraph 27 above). This prevents Russian courts from adjudicating on even small claims or disputes of a technical nature without holding a hearing, as courts in other jurisdictions may do. Whenever an oral hearing is held, the parties have the right to attend and to make submissions to the bench. Any party may, as a matter of course, waive this right of his or her own free will and there will be no breach of the fair-hearing principle under Article 6 of the Convention as long as the waiver has been established in an unequivocal manner (see Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581/00, § 86, ECHR 2006-II; Gladkiy v. Russia, no. 3242/03, §§ 105 – 09, 21 December 2010; and Belan v. Russia (dec.), no. 56786/00, 2 September 2004).
  2. In many previous cases, the Russian courts have routinely denied incarcerated litigants the possibility to appear, relying on the fact that there was no legally established procedure for bringing prisoners from the penal facility to the place where their civil claim was being heard (see the case-law cited in paragraph 24 above). Indeed, the right to appear in person before a court is in principle unrestricted in Russian civil proceedings (see paragraph 28 above) but the Code of Civil Procedure and the Code on the Execution of Sentences make no provision for the exercise of that right by litigants who are detained pending trial or are serving a sentence (see paragraph 11 above). The Court has rejected that approach by the Russian courts as being excessively formalistic, noting that the absence of legislation on prisoners’ attendance at hearings cannot be interpreted as sufficient grounds for depriving them of the right to appear (see Gryaznov, cited above, § 50). Just as no provision of domestic law should be interpreted and applied in a manner incompatible with the State’s obligations under the Convention (see v. Croatia, no. 28261/06, § 21, 15 January 2009), a lacuna in the domestic law cannot be a justification for failing to give full force to the Convention standards.
  3. The Court has found a violation of Article 6 in a large number of cases in which Russian courts refused to secure attendance of imprisoned applicants wishing to take part in the hearing on their civil claims (see, in addition to the cases cited above, Dmitriyev v. Russia, no. 40044/12, § 48 – 51, 24 October 2013; Bortkevich v. Russia, no. 27359/05, §§ 63 – 69, 2 October 2012; Karpenko v. Russia, no. 5605/04, § 89 – 94, 13 March 2012; Rozhin v. Russia, no. 50098/07, §§ 31 – 34, 6 December 2011; and Artyomov v. Russia, no. 14146/02, §§ 204 – 08, 27 May 2010). Whereas all of those cases concerned the same Convention issue, namely the incarcerated applicant’s right to present his case effectively before the courts, some of them presented a slight variation in the underlying factual circumstances. Accordingly, before embarking on an analysis of the present cases, the Court considers it useful to set out the way in which it analyses an alleged violation of the right to a fair trial, as it has emerged in its case-law in respect of this type of case.

(a) Whether the domestic courts weighed the necessity of the applicant’s personal presence

  1. The first element of the Court’s analysis is to determine whether the domestic courts weighed the necessity of the applicant’s appearance in court in relation to the nature of the dispute and whether they adduced convincing reasons for denying the applicant possibility to appear.
  2. The Court reiterates at the outset that, by virtue of Article 53 of the Convention, the domestic law may set a higher or more comprehensive standard for the protection of human rights than that afforded by the provisions of the Convention and its Protocols. In establishing a universal right of the parties to civil proceedings to have an oral hearing on their claim, the Russian law endows the litigants with a legitimate expectation that they will be given an opportunity to appear before the judge. As noted in paragraph 22 above, this approach goes beyond the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention, which does not guarantee the right to an oral hearing or the right to appear before a court in person, but rather enshrines a more general principle of fairness of proceedings (see Gladkiy, cited above, § 103, with further references). The Court has previously accepted that in civil proceedings concerning claims of a technical nature, the parties’ presence was of lesser significance. Where the claim was not based on the applicant’s personal experiences, his or her appearance at the hearing was not considered to be indispensable for the proceedings to be recognised as having been “fair” (see the case-law cited in paragraph 24 above). Nevertheless, in a situation where an applicant is incarcerated and cannot freely decide whether or not to attend the hearing, in order for the proceedings to be considered “fair” it is not sufficient that the applicant’s absence should coincide with the absence of the procedural adversary, for such coincidence is merely fortuitous given that the absence or presence of the other party is beyond the applicant’s control.
  3. Thus, to ensure compliance with the requirements of Article 6, the domestic courts must assess whether the nature of the dispute is such as to require the incarcerated litigant’s appearance before the bench. The Court has already given indications in its case-law as to the types of disputes that call for the litigant’s mandatory appearance before the court, irrespective of whether he or she is represented (see the case-law cited in paragraph 25 above). Given the large variety of types of civil disputes, compiling an exhaustive list of such cases is a daunting task and the domestic courts, which have the advantage of possessing direct knowledge of the situation, are better placed to determine the nature of each claim and the underlying legal interests (see v. France, no. 18851/07, § 42, 12 April 2012).
  4. It is therefore incumbent on the domestic courts, once they have become aware of the fact that one of the litigants is in custody and unable to attend the hearings independent of his or her wishes, to verify, prior to embarking on the examination of the merits, whether the nature of the case is such as to require the incarcerated litigant’s personal testimony and whether he or she has expressed a wish to attend. If the domestic courts contemplate dispensing with the litigant’s presence, they must provide specific reasons why they believe that the absence of the party from the hearing will not be prejudicial for the fairness of the proceedings as a whole. It falls to them to examine all the arguments for and against holding hearings in the absence of one of the parties, taking into account, in particular, the Court’s case-law in similar cases and the nature of the contentious issues, and to apprise the incarcerated litigant in good time of their decision on the matter and the reasons for it (see the resolution by the Russian Supreme Court in paragraph 15 above). The decision must be communicated to the litigant sufficiently in advance so that he or she may dispose of adequate time for deciding on a further course of action for the defence of his or her rights (see Gryaznov, cited above, § 48, and Khuzhin and Others, cited above, § 107).
  5. It is essentially on the basis of the reasons in the domestic decisions that the Court will determine whether or not the exclusion of an applicant undermined the fair-hearing principle. A lack or deficiency of reasons in the domestic decisions cannot be supplemented ex post facto in the proceedings before the Court, for the Court cannot take the place of the national courts that considered the issue of the litigant’s appearance before the court (see, mutatis mutandis, Valeriy Kovalenko v. Russia, no. 41716/08, § 49, 29 May 2012). It is apposite to recall in this connection that the Russian Constitutional Court reminded the courts of general jurisdiction of their duty to take into account “all relevant circumstances, including the legal character of the constitutional rights involved” when deciding whether a convicted prisoner should participate in civil proceedings and to give a “reasoned decision” on this matter (see paragraph 13 above).
  6. The analysis that the Court expects to find in domestic decisions must go beyond a reference to deficiencies in the legal framework which rendered the attendance of the incarcerated litigant impossible. It must build on the concrete reasons for and against the litigant’s presence, interpreted in the light of the Convention requirements and all relevant factors, such as the nature of the dispute and the civil rights concerned.

(b) Whether the domestic courts considered making procedural arrangements with a view to upholding the fairness of the proceedings

  1. The second limb of the Court’s analysis concerns the counterbalancing measures that need to be put in place to guarantee that incarcerated litigants can participate in court proceedings effectively.
  2. The issue of the exercise of procedural rights by detainees in civil proceedings has been examined on several occasions by the Russian Constitutional Court, which has identified various ways in which their rights can be secured (see paragraphs 12 – 14 above). The Constitutional Court emphasised the importance of making incarcerated litigants fully aware of their procedural rights and obligations, ensuring a timely service of claim forms, procedural documents and judicial acts and affording them sufficient time to appoint a representative and to prepare their position. It pointed out that the court hearing a claim may resort to conducting proceedings via a video link or move the hearing to a location closer to the custodial facility.
  3. The particular form of procedural arrangements for securing a detainee’s effective participation depends on many factors, the most important one being the question whether the claim involves his or her personal experience and, accordingly, whether the court needs to take oral evidence directly from him or her. Concrete practical solutions consistent with the fairness requirement ought to be found by the domestic courts with regard to the local situation, the technical equipment available in the courthouse and in the detention facility where the detainee is being held, the accessibility of legal aid services, and other relevant elements. Having considered such arrangements, the domestic courts must inform the detainee accordingly and in good time, so that he has adequate time and facilities to decide on the course of action for the defence of his rights (see Shilbergs, cited above, § 108, and Khuzhin and Others, cited above, § 107).
  4. If the claim is based largely on the detainee’s personal experience, his oral submissions to the court would be “an important part of [his or her] presentation of the case and virtually the only way to ensure adversarial proceedings” (see, most recently, v. Croatia, no. 16115/13, § 128, 5 June 2014, and Shilbergs, cited above, § 111). Only by testifying in person could the detainee substantiate his claims and answer the judges’ questions, if any. In these circumstances, obvious solutions would be to conduct the proceedings at the place where the claimant is being detained, or to use a video link (see Vladimir Vasilyev v. Russia, no. 28370/05, § 84, 10 January 2012).
  5. As regards the use of a video link or videoconferencing equipment, this form of participation in proceedings is aimed, among other things, at reducing the delays incurred in transferring detainees and thus simplifying and accelerating the proceedings (see Kabwe v. the United Kingdom (dec.), nos. 29647/08 and 33269/08, 2 February 2010, and Marcello Viola v. Italy, no. 45106/04, § 70, ECHR 2006-XI (extracts)). Resorting to such facilities is not, as such, incompatible with the notion of a fair and public hearing, but it must be ensured that the detainee is able to follow the proceedings, to see the persons present and hear what is being said, but also to be seen and heard by the other parties, the judge and witnesses, without technical impediment (see Sakhnovskiy v. Russia [GC], no. 21272/03, § 98, 2 November 2010, and Marcello Viola, cited above, §§ 72 – 74).
  6. Organising a court session outside the courtroom is, by contrast, a time-consuming exercise. In addition, holding it in a place such as a detention facility, to which the general public in principle has no access, is attended by the risk of undermining its public character. In such cases, the State is under an obligation to take compensatory measures to ensure that the public and the media are duly informed about the place of the hearing and are granted effective access (see Starokadomskiy v. Russia (no. 2), no. 27455/06, §§ 55 – 63, 13 March 2014, and Riepan v. Austria, no. 35115/97, § 30, ECHR 2000-XII).
  7. The taking of evidence on commission is also consistent with the notion of a fair trial. The authority to hear the detainee may be delegated to a judge or a court at a location closer to the custodial facility. Combined with oversight by the trial judge throughout the proceedings, in order to ensure that the detainee is at all times aware of the arguments by the opposing party and able fully and properly to answer it, the questioning of the detainee outside the courtroom would not be contrary to the principle of a fair trial (compare Kabwe v. the United Kingdom (dec.), cited above).
  8. In cases where the domestic court determined that it was less important for the detainee to testify in person, his or her right to a fair trial may be guaranteed by way of some form of representation. The Russian Legal Aid Act establishes the criteria for eligibility to legal aid based on the litigant’s income and the type of dispute to which he is a party (see paragraph 10 above). The list of dispute types is exhaustive and does not include, for instance, a claim for compensation for degrading conditions of detention. In cases involving this type of claim, the Court has not been satisfied on the basis of the available information that the Russian legal aid system offered applicants sufficient protection of their rights (see Vladimir Vasilyev, cited above, § 85; and also, for comparison, Staroszczyk v. Poland, no. 59519/00, § 129, 22 March 2007, and Larin, cited above, §§ 53 – 55). If a detainee cannot afford the costs of professional legal representation, he has the option of appointing a relative, friend or acquaintance to represent him in the proceedings (see Article 49 of the Code of Civil Procedure and paragraph 29 above). In this situation the domestic courts must ascertain, firstly, that the detainee has sufficient time to find a person willing to represent him and to instruct that person and, secondly, that the detainee’s chances of having a fair hearing are not prejudiced on account of non-professional representation.
  9. Lastly, the Court observes that whenever the domestic courts opt for procedural arrangements aiming to compensate for the handicap which a detainee’s absence from the courtroom has created, they are expected to verify whether the chosen solution would respect the absent party’s right to present his case effectively before the court and would not place him at a substantial disadvantage his opponent. It will then fall to the Court to judge whether the safeguards that were put in place to ensure that the detainee could participate fully in the proceedings were sufficient and whether the proceedings as a whole were fair in terms of Article 6 of the Convention.

(c) Conclusion

  1. The Court must first examine the manner in which the domestic courts assessed the question whether the nature of the dispute required the applicants’ personal presence. Secondly, it must determine whether the domestic courts put in place any procedural arrangements aiming at guaranteeing their effective participation in the proceedings.


  1. Application of the above principles to the instant cases


  1. In the present cases, the applicants’ civil claims varied in nature. However, the decisions of the domestic courts disclose no consideration of the issue whether the nature of each dispute was such as to require the applicants’ attendance and whether their attendance was essential in order to ensure the overall fairness of the proceedings. Failure to pay due attention to the particular characteristics of each civil claim brought before them led the domestic courts to deny the applicants an opportunity to participate in the hearing, irrespective of the subject matter of the proceedings.
  2. The domestic courts refused the applicants’ request for appearance, relying on the absence of any legal norm making their presence mandatory. As the Court has noted in paragraph 31 above, invoking a technical ground without addressing the substantive issue whether the nature of the dispute is such as to require the party to appear in person is incompatible with genuine respect for the principle of a fair hearing, for an applicant cannot be expected to bear the burden of the legislator’s failure to provide for the special situation of incarcerated parties to civil proceedings. Contrary to the Government’s claim that the applicants could have effectively presented their case to the courts because they had been duly informed of all the hearings, merely informing the applicants of the hearing date was insufficient in a situation where the current state of the domestic law in reality prevented them from attending.
  3. A number of other possibilities for securing the applicants’ participation in the proceedings – which were mentioned in the case-law of the Russian Constitutional Court – was available to the domestic courts. As it happened, the domestic courts did not at all consider those options (compare Shilbergs, cited above, § 109). The Court finds it particularly striking that the national courts not only failed to approach each case individually but also disregarded the options that were explicitly listed by the Constitutional Court for securing the applicants’ procedural rights in similar circumstances (see paragraphs 12 – 14 and 40 above).
  4. Having regard to its previous case-law and the circumstances of the present cases, the Court finds that (i) by failing to properly assess the nature of the civil claims brought by the applicants with a view to deciding whether their presence was indispensable and by focussing instead on deficiencies in the domestic law, and (ii) by failing to consider appropriate procedural arrangements enabling the applicants to be heard, the domestic courts deprived the applicants of the opportunity to present their cases effectively and failed to meet their obligation to ensure respect for the principle of a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 of the Convention.
  5. There has therefore been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.


III. Other alleged violations of the Convention


  1. The applicants Mr Makhov, Mr Resin (in two cases), Mr Anikanov, Mr Lebetskiy, Mr Gromovoy, Mr Gordeyev, Mr Martirosyan and Mr Vinokhodov complained that the conditions of their detention in the Russian penal facilities or the conditions of transport between them had amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment prohibited under Article 3 of the Convention. The Court reiterates that in the absence of an effective remedy for that grievance, the complaint about inadequate conditions of detention or transport should have been introduced within six months of the last day of the applicants’ detention or transport (see Norkin v. Russia (dec.), no. 21056/11, 5 February 2013, and Markov and Belentsov v. Russia (dec.), nos. 47696/09 and 79806/12, 10 December 2013). However, the periods complained of had ended more than six months before they lodged their complaints with the Court. The date of the final decision rejecting their claims for compensation cannot be relied upon as resetting the time-limit for their complaints. It follows that these complaints are inadmissible for non-compliance with the six-month rule set out in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.
  2. The Court has also examined the other complaints submitted by the applicants. However, having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as those complaints fall within the Court’s competence, it finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that these parts of the applications must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.


  1. Application of Article 41 of the Convention


  1. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”


  1. Damage


  1. The applicants claimed various amounts in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. The Government considered their claims to be excessive.
  2. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found under Article 6 of the Convention and the pecuniary damage alleged by some of the applicants; it therefore rejects these claims. On the other hand, it awards 1,500 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable, to each of the applicants, except Mr Morozov. Mr Morozov claimed EUR 1,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and, by virtue of the non ultra petita principle, the Court awards him that sum, plus any tax that may be chargeable.
  3. The Court holds that when an applicant has suffered an infringement of his right to a fair hearing guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention, he should, as far as possible, be put in the position in which he would have been had the requirements of that provision not been disregarded. The most appropriate form of redress would, in principle, be the reopening of the proceedings, if requested, without unduly upsetting the principles of res judicata or legal certainty in civil litigation, in particular where such litigation concerns third parties with their own legitimate interests to be protected (see Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], no. 22251/08, §§ 57 – 58, ECHR 2015, and also Bortkevich, § 76, and Rozhin, § 40, both cited above, with further references). A finding by the Court of a violation of the Convention or its Protocols is a ground for reopening civil proceedings under Article 392 §§ 2(2) and 4(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure and for reviewing the domestic judgments in the light of the Convention principles established by the Court (see Davydov v. Russia, no. 18967/07, §§ 10 – 15, 30 October 2014).
  4. Lastly, the Court points out that the failure to uphold the applicants’ right to present their cases effectively before the courts which gave rise to the finding of a violation in this case appears to be linked to a deficiency of the Russian legal system which makes no provision for detainees’ participation in civil proceedings (see paragraph 31 above). The Court has already highlighted the widespread nature of the problem in many previous cases that have come before it (see paragraph 32 above). This situation in principle calls for the adoption of general measures by the respondent State, which remains, subject to monitoring by the Committee of Ministers, free to choose the means by which it will discharge its legal obligation under Article 46 of the Convention, provided that such means are compatible with the conclusions set out in the Court’s judgment (see Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, § 249, ECHR 2000-VIII; and Broniowski v. Poland [GC], no. 31443/96, § 192, ECHR 2004-V).


  1. Costs and expenses


  1. Mr Morozov claimed EUR 1,500 in legal costs and submitted his lawyer’s invoice. Mr Makhov, who had been granted legal aid, stated that his representative had worked eighteen hours on his case at the rate of EUR 150 per hour, totalling EUR 2,700. Mr Resin claimed approximately EUR 3,000 for the work of his representative in two cases. Mr Lebetskiy sought reimbursement of EUR 10. Mr Gromovoy, who had been granted legal aid, claimed approximately EUR 7,260 in legal costs. Mr Vinokhodov’s claim in respect of costs amounted to approximately EUR 1,950. The applicants Mr Yevdokimov and Mr Rezanov, Mr Anikanov, Mr Gordeyev and Mr Martirosyan did not make a claim for costs or expenses.
  2. The Government contested the claims as excessive and unsubstantiated.
  3. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sums set out in Annex II, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants.


  1. Default interest


  1. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.




  1. Decides to join the applications;
  2. Declares the complaint concerning the unfairness of the civil proceedings admissible and the remainder inadmissible;
  3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
  4. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay, within three months of the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the amounts listed in Annex II to the applicants who are listed in this Annex, plus any tax that may be chargeable, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement, simple interest shall be payable on such amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period, plus three percentage points;

  1. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.


Done in English, and notified in writing on 16 February 2016, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Luis  GUERRA President

Stephen PHILLIPSRegistrar

Annex I

Application number and applicant’s name Date of introduction Name of the court and date of the final decision in the civil proceedings concerned Periods of detention or transport complained of

Denis Viktorovich Yevdokimov and Artem Sergeyevich Rezanov

09/04/2005 Altay Regional Court,

2 February 2005


Aleksandr Yevgenyevich Morozov

14/10/2005 Yaroslavl Regional Court,

12 July 2005


Andrey Anatolyevich Anikanov

11/10/2007 Voronezh Regional Court,

15 November 2007;

Moscow Regional Court,

19 January 2010.

6 March 2007 – 7 March 2007

Petr Petrovich Makhov

25/05/2011 Murmansk Regional Court,

6 April 2011

1 April 2005 – 27 September 2007

Oleg Aleksandrovich Gordeyev

02/09/2011 Chelyabinsk Regional Court,

14 April 2011

1 November 2005 – 18 November 2005

Andrey Igorevich Resin

18/11/2011 Khabarovsk Regional Court,

3 August 2011

15 December 2008 – 25 March 2009

Yuriy Aleksandrovich Lebetskiy

23/01/2012 Perm Regional Court,

5 December 2011

6 – 18 June 2007,

22 – 30 June 2007,

22 – 25 July 2007, and 29 September – 12 October 2007


Dmitriy Aleksandrovich Gromovoy

01/02/2012 Chelyabinsk Regional Court,

15 August 2011

20 January 2011 – 15 April 2011

Sergey Valeryevich Martirosyan

21/05/2012 Supreme Court of the Udmurtiya Republic,

16 January 2012


Andrey Igorevich Resin

20/03/2012 Irkutsk Regional Court,

27 April 2012

12 – 15 January 2008, 15 – 18 March 2008, 12 – 15 December 2008 and

25 – 29 March 2009


Yuriy Mikhaylovich Vinokhodov

17/09/2012 Orel Regional Court,

25 July 2012


Annex II

Application number and applicant’s name Represented by Award in respect of non-pecuniary damage Award in respect of costs and expenses

Denis Viktorovich Yevdokimov and Artem Sergeyevich Rezanov

P. Finogenov EUR 1,500

to each applicant


Aleksandr Yevgenyevich Morozov

C. Meyer EUR 1,000 EUR 850

Andrey Anatolyevich Anikanov

EUR 1,500

Petr Petrovich Makhov

V. Bokareva EUR 1,500

Oleg Aleksandrovich Gordeyev

E. Aminov EUR 1,500
76438/11 and 57043/12

Andrey Igorevich Resin

A. Molostov EUR 1,500 EUR 850

Yuriy Aleksandrovich Lebetskiy

EUR 1,500 EUR 10

Dmitriy Aleksandrovich Gromovoy

M. Kuzmina EUR 1,500

Sergey Valeryevich Martirosyan

EUR 1,500

Yuriy Mikhaylovich Vinokhodov

A. Polozova EUR 1,500 EUR 850

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